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assistance.1. Introduction
A spate of empirical cross-country studies by Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995),
Ben-David (1993), Edwards (1998) and Coe et. al. (1997) suggests that the impact of
liberalization of trade in goods on the long run rate of economic growth is positive,
although a recent paper (Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999)) questions the robustness of the
results.  While  the  state  of  the  debate  seems to  be  in  ferment,  it  is  surprising that
comparable analysis depicting the impact of services trade liberalization on economic
growth is more sparse.
If liberalizing trade in goods, which typically accounts for less than half of GDP in most
countries, and even less than a third of output in the industrial economies, can affect
economy-wide growth, then there should be comparable gains from liberalizing services
that are becoming increasingly tradable and that account for a large and growing share of
output in most countries.
The paper has three purposes.  First, it explains how the impact of  liberalization of
service sectors (hereafter "services trade liberalization") on output growth differs from
that  of  liberalization of  trade  in  goods (hereafter "goods  liberalization".)  Second, it
suggests a  measure  of the  openness of  a  country's  services regime.  Such openness
measures are constructed  for two key  service sectors, basic telecommunications and
financial  services.  Finally, these openness measures are introduced in  cross-country
growth regressions a la Barro (1997) and Sachs-Warner (1995, 1997) to test whether the
openness of the policy regime in services has an impact on long run economic growth.
We reach three broad conclusions. First, services liberalization is different from trade in
goods because the former involves factor mobility and leads to  scale effects that are
distinctive though not unique. Second, it is possible to construct policy-based rather than
outcome-based  measures  of  openness  for  the  services  sectors  that  capture  these
differences.  Third,  there  is  some  econometric evidence-relatively  strong  for  the
financial  sector  and  less  strong  but  nevertheless  statistically  significant  for  the
telecommunications  sector-that  openness  in  services  influences  long  run  growth
performance. Our estimates suggest that countries with fully open telecom and financial
services sectors  grow up  to  1.5 percentage points  faster than other countries.  These
results,  however,  need  to  be  refined  by  incorporating more  information  in  the
construction  of indices of openness and testing whether they hold for  other services
sectors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 of this paper contrasts
liberalization in goods with that in services and explains why the latter can be expected to
lead to both static and dynamic improvements in economic performance. Section 3 of the
paper reviews some of the existing literature on the links between services trade and long
run economic growth.  Section 4 presents our methodology regarding construction of the
openness indices for the telecommunications  and financial services sectors. A description
3of the data and the regression results can be found in section 5 of the paper. And finally,
section 6 spells out our conclusions.
2. The Static and Dynamic Benefits of Liberalising Trade in Services
It is not difficult to identify the many ways that efficient services contribute to improved
economic performance.  An  efficient and well-regulated financial  sector  leads to  an
efficient transformation of savings to investment, ensuring that resources are deployed
where they have the highest returns; benefits also arise from increased financial product
variety  and  better  risk-sharing  in  the economy.  In the  case  of  telecommunications,
improved efficiency generates economy-wide benefits as telecommunications are a vital
intermediate input and are also crucial to the dissemination and diffusion of knowledge-
the spread of the internet and the dynamism that that has lent to economies around the
world is telling testimony to the importance of telecommunications services.  Similarly,
transport services contribute to the efficient distribution of goods within a country and a
country's  ability to  participate  in  global trade,  thus  helping  realize  the  benefits  of
integration.  Although these are the more prominent services, others are also crucial-
business  services  such  as  accounting and  legal  services  are  important  in  reducing
transaction costs.  Collier and Gunning (1999) consider high transaction costs as the most
significant impediment to economic growth in Africa. According to Summers (1999), the
single most important innovation in the history of the American capital markets was the
idea of generally accepted accounting principles. Software development is the foundation
of the modern information-based economy. Education and health services are necessary
in  building  up  the  stock  of  human  capital,  a  key  ingredient  in  long  run  growth
performance.
Ideally, we would seek to measure the impact of liberalization in each of these sectors,
but the paucity of data forces a narrower focus.  Our formal analysis deals with the core
infrastructure services, finance  and telecommunications, the only  services sectors for
which it was possible at this stage to put together comprehensive cross-country data sets.
Static benefits.  Goods  and Services
In static models without market imperfections (such as monopolistic market structures,
internal and external economies of scale or other distortions), restrictions on trade in
goods reduce the  level of real GDP, which  is equivalent to  a loss in welfare.  The
restriction creates a wedge between domestic and foreign prices, leading to a  loss in
consumer surplus that is greater than the gain in producer surplus arising from higher
domestic production and in government revenue. 1 The net impact on welfare is therefore
negative.  Restrictions on trade in services can, in principle, be expected to have similar
welfare costs as they too drive a wedge between domestic and foreign prices of services.
' The presence of imperfections opens up a plethora of possibilities in which the effects of trade policies are
typically indeterminate, depending on the prior distortion.
4Many of the empirical sectoral studies produced so far support this contention. 2 It has
been  suggested that in the case of services, there is an additional twist  in that many
services are inputs into production and inefficient production of such services acts as a
tax  on production. Thus, goods liberalization in the absence of services liberalization
could well result in negative effective protection for goods, highlighting the need for the
latter to  keep pace with the former. 3 Analytically, however, the case for liberalizing
services inputs is no different from that relating to goods inputs.
For instance, Deardoff (2001) has  argued that  there are particularly large gains  from
eliminating barriers to trade in services like transport that facilitate trade.  In addition to
the standard triangles of dead-weight loss gained in the services sector itself, there are the
rectangles of efficiency gains from lower trading costs in the user sector. However, there
still is no reason why liberalization should affect the long-run growth rate.
Dynamic Benefits
In  examining the link between services and  growth, a key  question is why the link
between liberalization of services and economic growth might be expected to be different
from that between goods liberalization and growth.
Liberalizing Trade in Goods and Growth
In theoretical models, the impact of trade liberalization on economic growth is either
absent or ambiguous. In a conventional neoclassical growth model, trade does not affect
the equilibrium or steady state rate of output growth because, by assumption, growth is
determined by exogenously given technological progress.  In two-sector models of this
kind,  trade  policy affects the  allocation of resources between sectors  and hence the
steady-state level of savings and capital accumulation. This can have a one-off effect on
the steady-state level of output (which can be positive or negative depending on how
savings and capital accumulation are affected by trade policy), but not on the rate of
growth.
However, in  endogenous growth models, the impact of trade liberalization on output
growth can be positive or negative, as emphasized by Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999).  If
the resource allocation effects of trade policy changes promote sectors or activities that
generate more  long-run  growth, the  impact is positive,  and  negative otherwise. For
example,  if  trade  liberalization  shifts resources  into  manufacturing and  away  from
agriculture, this  will  have  a  positive  impact  on  long  run  growth if  manufacturing
generates greater positive externalities or creates knowledge, that is, if it possesses the
2 See Hoekman and Braga (1997) for a review.
3  See Hoekman and Djankov (1997) for evidence on Egypt.
5attributes necessary for endogenous growth. The impact of trade policy on growth is thus
an empirical question. 4
Services trade liberalization and growth
It  does not  seem unreasonable to  assume that  certain services industries, like certain
goods  industries,  possess  growth  generating  characteristics.  In  sectors  like
telecommunications,  software, financial  services and  transport,  there  is  considerable
scope  for  learning  by  doing,  knowledge generation, expanding  product variety,  and
upgrading product quality, though the precise extent of these possibilities is an empirical
question.
What is it that really distinguishes trade in services from trade in goods? For a number of
services, there is no difference: trade is conducted in much the same manner as trade in
goods, with the service (say software) produced in one country and supplied cross-border
to a consumer in another country. But for many other services, from local phone calls to
transportation,  the  simultaneity  of  production  and  consumption implies  a  need  for
proximity between the consumer and producer and hence it is necessary for the factors of
production  (capital  and  labor) to  move to  the location of the  consumer. 5 Secondly,
barriers to  entry in a number of services sectors, ranging from telecommunications to
professional services, are maintained not only against foreign suppliers but also against
new domestic suppliers.  Full liberalization can, therefore, lead to enhanced competition
from both domestic and foreign suppliers.
The key difference between trade in goods and services in terms of their growth impact
stems from these two distinguishing features of  services liberalization:  the fact that
"imports" of services must be locally produced and that liberalization leads to enhanced
competition, both  domestic  and  foreign. 6 Greater  foreign factor participation  and
increased competition together imply a large scale of activity, and hence greater scope for
generating the special growth-enhancing effects.  In fact, if foreign participation merely
substitutes for  domestic  factors  and  the  sector does  not  expand,  i.e. the  degree of
competition  remains  unchanged, then there  cannot  be  a  positive  growth  impact  on
account of the scale effect. Conversely, a  larger scale achieved merely by eliminating
4  It is worth noting that increased trade per se can also have a generalized positive impact on growth. For
example, trade enables a  country  to employ a  larger variety of intermediate  goods and capital
equipment which could enhance the productivity of its other resources.  Furthermore, trade makes it
possible for a country to acquire technology developed worldwide, especially in the form of embodied
capital goods. See for example Grossman and Helpman (1991) and the references therein.
s  While factor movements, especially FDI, also take place to produce goods, the difference is that these
are alternatives to cross-border trade, and not essential to supply a particular market.
6  Factor mobility per se does not affect growth.  For example, even if FDI results in greater capital
formation in an economy, the steady state level of growth need not be raised.  This can also be seen
from a savings-investment  perspective. FDI augments the available pool of savings to an economy. In
the Solow-Swan growth models, it is a well-known  result that higher savings do not permanently raise
the growth rate of an economy.
6domestic barriers to  entry and attracting domestic resources from other sectors would
suffice to generate larger endogencus growth. 7
Secondly, even  without  scale  effects  and  even  if  services  sectors  do  not  possess
endogenous growth attributes, the import of foreign factors that characterizes services
sector liberalization could still have positive effects because they are likely to bring with
them the source of endogenous growth, namely, technology. If greater technology transfer
accompanies  services  liberalization--either embodied  in  foreign direct  investment or
disembodied-the  growth effect will be stronger.  Coe, Helpman, and Hoffmaister (1999)
present empirical evidence demonstrating the impact of technology diffusion-in  their
case through trade in goods-on  total factor productivity growth.  At least theoretically,
the same should hold true for technology that is diffused through factor flows.
We have so far not addressed an important question:  In an economy that witnesses large
factor flows, what should be the appropriate aggregate measure of welfare?  It would
seem more appropriate to  use  GNP as the measure of welfare.  If an  economy is a
consistent net importer  (exporter) of factors, using GDP, as the unit of measurement
would overstate (understate) the measure of economic welfare.  The growth effects that
we have so far spoken of refer to all local production, i.e. implicitly to GDP growth.
What can we say about the impact on GNP growth?  The impact on GNP growth can be
disaggregated into a factor impact and a productivity impact. The impact of liberalization
on employment of the nationally-owned factors in the services sector is ambiguous. If the
sector was domestically competitive prior to liberalization, then national employment in
the sector will certainly decline if the country is a net importer of that service.  But if
there were also restrictions on domestic entry prior to liberalization, then it is possible
that national employment will also expand.
While  the employment effect is  ambiguous, the productivity of national factors will
unambiguously  increase due  to  liberalization of  a  service sector that  requires  local
presence.  Liberalization will lead, first, to an increase in the aggregate scale of the sector
and, secondly, to technology spillovers from the local presence of foreign factors.  Both
effects  will  enhance  the productivity of  the nationally  owned factors.  Taking the
employment  and  productivity effects  together  we  can  conclude  that  the  effect  of
liberalization on GNP is ambiguous.
7  As pointed out by Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999), there are two contradictory impulses  on growth
emanating from the scale effect described above.  Protecting a sector increases its size, leading to
higher growth, but it also creates a wedge between domestic and foreign prices imposing a production
inefficiency which rises over time exerting a negative impact on growth. The larger the size of the
protected sector the larger this impact. Liberalizing a goods producing sector in which a country has a
comparative disadvantage, would lead to static and allocative efficiency, but a decline in the size of the
sector, i.e., a negative scale effect. By contrast, liberalization  of the services sector in which a country
has a comparative disadvantage, will also lead to increased scale of activity in addition to the static
efficiency gains. This will strengthen the growth impact of liberalization.
7The Differential Impact of Eliminating Barriers to Foreien Provision in Goods and Services
Liberalizing Services  I  Liberalizins Goods
Foreign Provision:  Manner and implications
For many services, cross-border trade is not  Cross-border trade is always feasible and so factor
feasible, and so foreign provision requires  mobility is not required.
factor mobility.
Liberalization implies increased scale of  Liberalization implies contraction of domestic
domestic activity in import competing sectors  activity in import-competing sectors.
because:
foreign factors locate domestically and/or
domestic competition increases supported (in
sectors like telecom) by more effective
regulation.
STATIC  EFFECTS
Impact is similar for goods and services: liberalization leads to reduced prices and hence improved
welfare.
(The fact that services are inputs into production does not make the impact any different from
liberalization of goods inputs such as raw materials and capital goods.)
Dynamic Effects: Impact on GNP Growth
Effect I
Spillovers of technology or skills embodied in  Liberalizing trade would not have these effects but
factor flows will increase productivity of  liberalizing  FDI would 8.
national factors of production and hence
increase GNP.
Effect 2
Although scale of domestic activity (involving  In the import-competing sector, activity contracts.
the sum of foreign and domestic factors) is  But general equilibrium  effects will lead to the
likely to expand, employment of national  expansion of other sectors. If the latter possesses
factors of production need not.  attributes of endogenous growth, liberalization in
The impact on GNP growth will then comprise  goods could also lead to growth.
a factor effect (which could be negative) and a
productivity-enhancing effect which will be
positive.
3.  Review of Existing Literature on the Services - Growth Link
The existing literature on the link between services and growth focuses primarily on the
financial sector.  The seminal work is Goldsmith (1969), which stressed the role of
8 Technology spillovers could also occur from goods trade liberalization. See Grossman & Helpman
(1991).
8financial services in channeling irLvestment  funds to their most productive uses, thereby
promoting  growth of  output and  incomes. Goldsmith uses the  ratio  of the value  of
financial intermediary assets to GNP to gauge financial performance and enters it in a
regression  with  economic  growth  as  the  dependent  variable.  He  finds  a  "rough
parallelism"  between  economic  growth  and  financial  development.  However,  his
approach  suffers  from  endogeneity problems  and  from  not  including  other  growth
controls in his regressions.
More  recently, King  and  Levine  (1993a) postulate  that  financial  services can affect
growth  through  enhanced  capital  accumulation  and/or  technical  innovation.  They
systematically control for other factors affecting long run growth and construct additional
measures of financial sector development such as the ratio of liabilities of the financial
system to GDP and the ratio of gross claims on the private sector to GDP, which they use
in growth regressions.  They find their measures to be significant and the sizes of their
coefficients to  imply an  economically important relationship.  Finally, to  counter the
endogeneity problem, they study whether the level of financial sector development in
1960 as measured by one of their ratios, predicts the rate of economic growth over the
1960-1990 period.  They find indeed that the level of financial sector development in
1960 is a significant predictor of economic growth over the later period.
Levine (1997) adopts a functional approach to the link between financial development
and growth. He identifies five major functions that financial systems perform which help
in minimizing transactions costs and improving the allocation of real resources.  These
functions include facilitating the trading of risk, allocating capital to productive uses,
monitoring  managers,  mobilizing  savings  through  the  use  of  innovative  financial
instruments and lastly, easing the exchange of goods and services. However, the author
admits that research in this area does not sufficiently account for the role of international
trade in financial services. Moreover, the paper is silent on the role of policy.
Francois and Schuknecht (1999) regress the growth of per capita real GDP on a measure
of the general degree of openness in trade, on certain macroeconomic variables and the
concentration ratio  for  the  financial  sector. They find  a  strong positive  relationship
between growth and financial sector competition.  However, the concentration ratio is an
outcome based variable, and, moreover, a misleading indicator of the level of competition
in the banking system because a concentrated market for banking services can still be
contestable. A large number of  developed countries such as Canada and many European
countries have banking systems characterized by a  small number of  banks, but  still
produce competitive outcomes. 9
4.  Methodology and Data
9  See Claessens  and Klingebiel  (1999) and Vives  (1998).  For example,  the Netherlands,  Denmark  and
Finland have concentration ratios (as measured by the share of the 3 largest banks in total banking
sector assets)  of well over .7 for the 90s, but their banking systems  are still competitive  (see
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998).
9In  order  to  undertake  the  cross-country  regression  analysis,  we  take  two  distinct
approaches. Firstly, we construct indices of  openness for the telecommunications and
financial services sectors. Given the distinctiveness of service sectors discussed above, it
is important that the indices capture the two key elements that contribute to the dynamic
benefits  from  services liberalization  - degree of  competition  and  extent  of  foreign
ownership.  In the empirical work, and in recognition of the fact that regulation plays a
crucial role in delivering competition, particularly in the telecommunications sector, we
add  a  third  element-the  nature  of  regulation--in  constructing  the  index  for  the
telecommunications  sector.1° Since  data  on  the  quality  of  financial regulation  was
unavailable' I at the time the exercise was undertaken, we added openness to cross-border
trade (instead of regulation) as the third element of liberalization for financial services.
And  in  recognition of  the  argument  (advanced forcefully by  Rodriguez and  Rodrik
(1999)), that any measure of liberalization should reflect policy variables rather than
outcomes, we avoid the use of ex post indicators such as teledensity (in the case of the
telecommunications sector), or the degree of monetization of an economy (for financial
services).
An advantage of our index construction approach is that, in ranking various alternative
policy  combinations,  it  gives  credit  to  adoption  of  partial  liberalization  measures.
However, the disadvantage of ranking countries by various policy combinations and pre-
supposing competition to be more important than foreign ownership (or regulation, say) is
that it imposes a constraint on the data. A further constraint on the data is imposed by the
cardinality of the index, i.e., according to our index, the benefit of going from a situation
of competition and private ownership, but no independent regulator to a situation with all
three elements, is the same as that arising from moving from a situation with monopoly,
independent regulation, but no foreign ownership to  a  situation of monopoly, private
ownership and independent regulation.
Our  second  approach  is  motivated  by  the  consideration  that  sometimes,  partial
liberalization  may  not  bring  about significant  benefits. For  example,  privatizing  or
introducing foreign ownership without introducing competition (or establishing a separate
regulator),  would simply transfer monopoly rents  from the govemrnent to  the private
monopolist. Hence, we create dummy variables to test for the benefits of moving from
partial, or no liberalization, towards full liberalization. Full liberalization is defined in
relation  to  the  same  elements  of  liberalization  (competition,  ownership  and
10  It should  be noted  that  regulation  fosters  competition  in  two ways:  first,  it is necessary  for new entrants
to a market  to have  equitable  access  to certain  essential  facilities  provided  by the incumbent. Second,
even in the absence  of competition,  regulation  can in principle  force  a monopolistic  supplier  to behave
more competitively.  While  regulation  plays an important,  indeed  key  role, in the overall  efficiency  of
the financial  services  sector,  its main  role is prudential  rather  than  to foster  competition.
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001) are responsible  for a  new database on bank regulation  and
supervision.  The task of developing  an index of the quality  of banking  regulation  using information
from  this database  should  be undertaken.
10regulation/capital controls) that  we used  for  index  construction as  explained above.
Hence, we consider the telecom sector fully liberalized only if competition is introduced,
FDI is allowed, and if an independent regulator exists. Similarly, the financial sector is
fully liberalized according to our criteria, only if the banking sector is competitive/open to
entry, majority foreign ownership is allowed, and current and capital account transactions
are liberalized. Partial liberalization is interpreted as a situation where one or two of these
elements is missing, and cases where none of the elements is present is regarded as no
liberalization. This approach does not impose prior restrictions on the data, in terms of
the relative importance of the three criteria, and merely tests for the gains emanating from
full liberalization.
4.A  Openness Indicator  for  the Telecommunications  Sector
For basic telecommunications, the  challenge was to  integrate the three key aspects of
policy identified above-namely,  competition, foreign ownership, and regulation--into an
index.  Recent empirical work on the impact of policy changes on telecommunications
performance,  suggests  that  "competition  is  the  most  effective  agent  of  change,
privatization without regulation may not improve service, and regulation is especially
important when privatizing a monopoly incumbent" (Wallsten, 1999). Further research on
12 developing East Asian countries'  telecom sectors by Fink, Mattoo and Rathindran
(2001)  finds  positive  evidence  on  the  interaction of  competition  and  privatization.
Similarly, while foreign direct  investment is bound to  bring significant benefits, for
instance through the transfer of technology and the improvement of management, the
absence of competition and effective regulation may dilute these benefits.  Finally, the
existence of a regulator serves not only to  impose discipline on the final price in the
absence of competition, but is also needed to promote effective competition, by ensuring
access for rival service suppliers to the networks of incumbents on reasonable terms.
We create an index of liberalization (ranging from 1 to 9, with higher values signifying
greater liberalization). The index has a lexicographic character:  competition 12 is deemed
to be the most important element of policy followed by foreign ownership and then by
regulation.  Thus a regime in which competition is allowed is ranked higher than one in
which it is not, irrespective of the treatment of foreign investment and regulation.  The
latter aspects become relevant in ranking two regimes which are identical in terms of the
degree of competition allowed.  The most liberal value of the index arises when there is
competition between providers, no restrictions on FDI and an independent regulator, and
the most protected situation is a monopoly with foreign ownership prohibited and no
independent regulator (Annex 1 presents details on the construction of the index, and
figure 1, its values for  different countries).  The data comes from  a recently-created
World Bank-ITU database on policy in the telecommunications sector.
12  We use market structure data from a 1998 I.T.U. survey. The competition variable represents observed
market structure. However, it is well  known that in most countries, the number of basic telecom
operators is  fixed by  policy, making observed and  allowed market structure equivalent.  See for
example Fink et. al. (2001)
11From this information, we are also able to create a dummy variable for complete or full
openness in  telecommunications. The  dummy variable for complete  liberalization of
telecom takes the value 1 only if a country allows competition in the local, long distance
and international calling segments, allows FDI, and has an independent telecom regulator.
The variable takes the value zero if even one of the three above elements is lacking. In
other words, the dummy variable takes the value I for all those countries that received a
ranking of I according to the index described earlier, and takes the value zero for all other
13 countries
4.B  Openness  indicator for  the Financial  Services  Sector
The  openness indicator for  the financial  services sector is  constructed on  the  same
principles  as  that  for  the  telecommunications sector.  There  were,  however,  three
important differences.  First, we did not have data on the national policies relating to
competition and foreign ownership in financial services but inferred them from individual
countries'  commitments  under the General Agreement on  Trade in  Services.  These
commitments bear a close resemblance to actual policy (Mattoo, 1999). Secondly, we are
not  able to  capture the regulatory dimension because of the lack of comparable data
across  countries  14.  Regulation in  this  sector does  not  have  the  same competition
promoting role  that  it does in  the telecommunications sector, but  the  omission may
nevertheless be serious because the quality of banking and prudential regulation is of
paramount importance in addressing systemic risk.
We do, however, make an effort to capture the openness of a country's current and capital
account because  this  has  a  bearing both  on the  possibility of  cross-border trade  in
financial services and the conditions for establishing foreign commercial presence.  For
this purpose, we use the index of capital controls compiled by Dailami (2000) using
information  from  the  Annual  Report  on  Exchange  Arrangements  and  Exchange
Restrictions published by the I.M.F.
We  combine these policy elements into an index for openness to financial services trade
(ranging from 1 to 8) with higher values of the index indicating more financial openness.
This index has the virtue of being a combination of exogenous policy measures. For
individual country rankings, please refer to  the second column of Annex 3. The informed
reader may notice  some peculiarities in the rankings. For example, Brazil,  Indonesia,
Thailand and Colombia receive very illiberal rankings in terms of the criteria we inferred
from GATS commitments. However, despite not having committed to open entry in the
13  This approach is similar in spirit to the construction of the openness dummy variable in Sachs and
Warner (1995), where a country had to satisfy 5 criteria before it could be classified as being open.
14  As mentioned earlier, developing an index of regulatory quality from Barth, Caprio and Levine's
(2001) database should be on the cards.
12Figure 1. Openness indices by countryv
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13GATS, these countries have allowed entry in the past as can be seen if one examined their
bank concentration ratios, or the share of foreign banks in total number of banks. In order
to correct for such paradoxes, and as a robustness check in our regressions, we adjust the
financial  services liberalization index upward (i.e.,  assign more liberal rankings)  for
thosecountries that show low levels'5 of bank concentration, and a relatively high share'6
of foreign banks in total number of banks, but had initially received an illiberal ranking.
To see how the rankings change once this is done, refer to the third column'1 7 of annex 3.
To get a sense of how countries ranked in terms of our openness indices, refer figure 1.
The dummy variable for complete liberalization of financial services takes the value  I
only if the banking sector is competitive, majority foreign equity is allowed, and if the
country has a value of 1.6 or more on the Dailami index'8 of capital controls, and is zero,
otherwise. Alternatively, the dummy variable takes the value 1 for all those countries that
received a ranking of 1 according to the index of financial services liberalization, and is
zero, otherwise. We also construct a dummy variable representing those  countries that
had  fully liberalized both  sectors. It  takes the value  I  if  both telecom  and financial
services are fully liberal and is zero otherwise. It could been seen as the product of the
dummy variables for  full liberalization in telecom and full liberalization  in financial
services.
5.  Empirical Evidence
We run cross-country regressions for a sample of 60 countries for the period 1990-1999.19
Our regression specification is given below:
We considered the market competitive if the concentration ratio for the three largest banks was  0.5 or
below, i.e., if the three largest banks accounted for 50% or under of total banking sector assets. Data
on concentration  ratios was obtained from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine's database on Financial
Development and Structure.
16  We interpreted openness to foreign bank entry as having a foreign bank penetration rate of over 0.2, i.e.,
if there share of foreign banks in the total number of banks was 20% or over. Again, the data were
obtained from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine's database.
7  We do not however, adjust the index downward for countries that made open entry commitments in the
GATS, but have high levels of bank concentration and low foreign bank penetration, as the
commitments on open entry reflect a liberal  policy stance, making their banking markets contestable
despite the presence of only a few banks in the market.
18  Dailami considers countries that score 1.6 or more (on his index) open, and the rest closed.
19  The  choice  of  sample  period  was dictated by  two considerations. Firstly, the  period  should be
sufficiently long to allow meaningful inferences about long run growth performance. Secondly, since
services sector liberalization is quite recent, we could not go too far back. In fact, most of our policy
data pertains to the last few years.  It is assumed that our indices approximate cross-country variation
in the degree of protection of the  services sectors for the entire period 1990-1999. Our results may
suffer from a downward bias since some slow-growing  African countries have received a fairly liberal
ranking even though they were closed during much of the 1990s  but opened up in recent years.
14Gj =  a +  ±  X7  +  yR, ,  for j = I .......N
Where Gj,  our dependent variable, is the average annual growth rate of per capita GNP 20
between 1990 and 1999 in country j,  a is the constant term, Xj is the vector of standard
growth controls for country j,  Rj  is a vector of the openness to trade in  services for
country  j and N represents the number of countries in our sample.
The standard growth controls include the natural log of per-capita GNP in  1990 (the
convergence  variable),  a  lagged  value  of  the  investment  rate,  the  government
consumption to  GDP ratio to  proxy for the size of the  government and  government
induced  distortions, the  inflation rate  (which  serves  as  a  proxy  for  macroeconomic
imbalances), a proxy variable for political stability, an index representing the quality of
institutions2, geographical and regional dummies, a schooling ratio, and an index of tariff
and  non-tariff barriers. The data  for per capita GNP (evaluated at purchasing power
parity), the investment rate, the government consumption to GDP ratio, the inflation rate,
and the primary education enrollment rate were obtained from the World Development
Indicators database at the World Bank. The geographical and regional variables include
dummy variables  for tropical countries, Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and East
Asia, and are constructed as in Sachs Warner (1995), Edwards (1993) and Dollar (1992).
Paraguay and Ireland are treated as outliers22  and excluded from the regressions presented
here. The proxy for political stability and the index of institutional quality are from Sachs
and Warner (1995). The tariff and non-tariff barriers index 23 was obtained from the IMF.
A. Testing the significance of indices of liberalization.
The results  from the  estimation that include the telecom and financial services trade
liberalization indices are presented in table 3. Columns 1-3 pertain to the whole sample,
while the regression in column 4 includes only the 37 developing countries in the sample.
The results  suggest that both the extent of financial and telecom sector liberalization
contribute meaningfully to  explaining cross-country GNP growth performance. In the
context of the discussion in section 2, this in turn suggests that the productivity enhancing
effect and the increased scale of activity arising from liberalization more than compensate
for any fall in the employment of nationally owned factors of production. As evident from
the table, the coefficient on the financial sector index is consistently positive as expected,
20  In accordance with most growth studies, we used the GNP adjusted for purchasing power parity. The
average annual rate of growth was calculated by [ (In GNP,+n  - lnGNPt  )/ n], which is a fairly standard
practice in cross-country growth studies.
21  The index is compiled using information from  the International country risk guide. For more on the
index, see Keefer and Knack (1995).
22  Paraguay and Ireland were identified as outliers from the DFBETA statistic. On observation "i" may be
considered  an outlier if IDFBETAiI>2/4N,  where N represents the number of observations.
23  The index takes values from 1-10 with higher values being indicative of more protection.  For more,
refer Sharer et. a].
15and significant at the 5% percent level in all cases, even after controlling for the usual
determinants of growth. The telecommunications liberalization index is also consistently
positive, stable, and significant, albeit at the 10% level in the regressions that included
regional  dummies.  The  magnitudes  of  the  coefficients  are  also  fairly  stable.  The
magnitude of the coefficients on the indices is much higher for developing countries. All
growth controls but one appear with their expected signs 24. For partial scatter plots  of
growth against the liberalization indices after controlling for other factors, see figures 25 2
a and b below.
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Figure 2.a  Figure 2.b
As an alternative exercise, we construct a composite index of services trade liberalization
by taking the simple average of the telecom and financial services indices. The results are
presented in table 4. As before, columns 1-3 are for the whole sample, and column 4, for
only developing countries. The composite index is extremely significant, at the 1% level
in the regressions without regional dummies and at the 5%/  level in those with regional
dummies  and  the  regression  for  developing  countries.  Its  estimated  coefficient  is
remarkably stable and approximately the sum of the coefficients on the telecom and
financial services indices obtained from introducing the indices separately as done in
table 3. The partial scatter of growth and the composite index after controlling for other
factors is depicted in figure 3.
We also test for the  significance of the financial services index corrected for observed
market structure and foreign bank penetration. We run regressions similar to the ones in
24  The proxy for political stability appears with the wrong sign in some regressions, but is insignificant.
The  index  of  institutional quality is  also  insignificant, and  is wrongly  signed  in  a  few  of  the
regressions presented later.
25  Please note that the scatters correct the x-axis variable for collinearity  with other regressors, so that the
positions of countries in the graph are not the original data points.
16tables 3 & 4 and find the results to be broadly similar. Table 5 shows that the financial
services liberalization index is still positively correlated with, and a significant predictor
of  growth over  the  90s. The telecom  liberalization index is  also  appears positively
significant at the 10% level in one case and at the 5% level in the other. Column 3 of
table  5  shows  that  the  composite  index (reconstructed after  adjusting the  financial
openness index) is a highly significant predictor of growth.
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B. Testing  for benefits of comrplete  liberalization
The  results  using  dummies  for  full  liberalization  are  presented  in  Table  6.  After
controlling for other determinants of growth, it is seen from column 1 that for the whole
sample, complete liberalization in the financial services sector has a significantly (at the
1% level) positive impact on growth. The dummy variable for complete liberalization of
telecom also has a positive and significant (at the 10% level) coefficient. Columns 3 and
4,  which  only  includes  developing  countries, features both  dummy  variables  being
positively significant influences on growth at the 5% level.
As a measure of complete liberalization of both sectors, we interact the liberalization
dummies of telecom with financial services so that the variable takes the value 1 if both
sectors are completely liberal in a given country, and zero otherwise. This variable is also
found to exert a significantly positive influence on growth in the 90s as seen in columns I
and 2 of table 7 for our whole sample, and columns 3 and 4 for developing countries only.
The coefficient estimate of .015 on the  dummy for complete liberalization in both sectors
seems to suggest that countries that fully liberalized both telecom and financial services
tend to grow up to 1.5 percentage points faster than others over the 90s. However, this
estimate needs to be qualified keeping in mind the limitations of the data, cross-country
estimation, and  due  to  the fact  that  it might be  capturing  one-shot gains  since  the
17liberalization variables  are constructed using information from  the  latter half  of  the
1990s. Another interesting observation from the results is that the magnitudes of the
coefficients on the liberalization indices is much higher for the regressions run over only
developing countries. This suggests that services liberalization could bring greater growth
benefits to developing countries.
Finally, it is worth noting that the estimated coefficient on the IMF trade restrictiveness
index  is also stable and statistically significant. On a priori grounds, we expected the
impact of services liberalization on growth to be greater than that of goods liberalization.
Yet, in the regressions, the I.M.F. index outperforms the telecom and financial services
indices in terms of  the magnitude and level of significance of its estimated coefficient.
We believe this could be because the services indices represent individual services sectors
whereas the goods trade restrictiveness index is an aggregate index for the primary and
manufacturing sectors. When the composite services index is used in a regression with
the IMF index, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on the former is higher and the
significance levels are comparable.
6.  Conclusion and Further Research
The paper had three objectives. First, it attempted to explain why and how the impact of
services  liberalization  on  output  growth  differed  from  that  of  goods  liberalization.
Second, it proposed a possible measure of the openness of a country's  services regime,
and constructed such measures for two key service sectors, basic telecommunications and
financial services.  Finally, in order to test whether the openness of the policy regime in
services had an  impact on long run economic growth, these openness measures were
introduced in cross-country growth regressions a la Barro and Sachs and Warner.
We reach three broad conclusions.  First, services liberalization is different from trade in
goods because the former necessarily involves factor mobility and leads to scale effects
that are distinctive though not unique. Together these can have important positive effects
on long run economic growth.
Second, it is possible to construct policy-based rather than outcome-based measures of
openness for the services sectors that capture these differences. Unlike in trade in goods
where the policy openness measure needs to capture only the openness to foreign supply,
in the case of services openness measures must capture both the policy regime toward
inward flows of foreign factors and measures that promote domestic competition.
26  Unlike the openness variable in Sachs and Warner (1995), the IMF index captures only trade policy
variables, and is therefore invulnerable to one of the  Rodriguez and Rodrik criticisms of the Sachs-
Warner variable, namely that their openness dummy is a proxy for macroeconomic policy imbalances.
18Third, there is some econometric evidence-relatively  strong and robust for the financial
sector and less strong but nevertheless statistically significant for the telecommunications
sector-that  openness to trade in services influences long run growth performance.
There remains considerable scope for refining and elaborating on this study. At the very
least,  the  exercise  would  need  to  cover  other  important  service  sectors  such  as
transportation as well as other financial sub-sectors such as insurance and securities 27.
Second, the quality of the openness indices needs to be refined both by using better data
(such  as panel  data)  and  improving our understanding of  how different elements of
policy-measures  affecting entry, foreign investment and regulation-interact  in differen,t
services sectors.
27  Barth, Caprio and Levine (2000) have conducted extensive cross-country studies on the relationship
between commercial bank regulation on the one hand and banking sector performance and financial
stability on the other. They incorporate information about permitted activities of commercial banks
(for example, insurance, securities , real estate and non-financial firm ownership).
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23Annex 1. Methodology for Constructing Telecom Index of Openness
The  telecommunications openness  index  was  constructed  using  information  on  the
market structure in basic telecom, whether FDI is allowed and whether an institutionally
independent telecom regulator was in place. Information on these elements was obtained
from the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). We assigned ranks based on  a
lexicographic scheme shown in the table below.
Table 1
RANK  MARKET  OWNERSHIP (FDI)  INDEPENDENT
STRUCTURE  REGULATOR
9  Competitive  FDI allowed  Yes
8  Competitive  FDI  allowed  No
7  Competitive  FDI not allowed  Yes
6  Competitive  FDI not allowed  No
5  Not Competitive  FDI allowed  Yes
4  Not Competitive  FDI allowed  No
3  Not competitive  FDI not allowed  Yes
(private)
2  Not competitive  FDI not allowed  Yes
(public)
1  Not competitive  FDI not allowed  No
So for example, Cote d'Ivoire, which has a monopoly in its local, domestic long distance
and international call segments, with  100% FDI allowed and an independent regulator,
gets a rank of 5 according to our scheme.
A complication arises from the definition of "the market."  Does it refer to international
calls  or  domestic  long distance  telephony or  to  local  calls?  Market structures and
ownership regulations typically are not uniform across these market segments.  Where
there  is variation across these  segments we  computed the weighted average  with  all
segments receiving equal weight.
24For example, in the case of Poland, the local segment is competitive, but the domestic
long distance and international segments are a monopoly.  It allows 49% FDI and does
not have an independent regulator. Poland would get a rank of 8 in our scheme if all
segments were competitive and a rank of 4 if all segments were uncompetitive. In our
view, the best measure was to take a weighted average of the two ranks accounting for the
fact that there are two uncompetitive segments (domestic long distance and international
calling) and  only one  competitive segment (local  calling). So the weighted rank  for
Poland would be:
(1/3* 8) +  (2/3*4) = 5.33
For a detailed description of how the countries in our sample ranked in terms of openness
in their telecom sectors, refer to Annex 3.
25Annex 2. Methodology for Computinsi Financial Services Index of Openness
The construction of the financial services index is similar in spirit to that of the telecom
index explained previously. We focused on domestic market structure, foreign ownership,
and  ease  of  cross-border trade  in  the  banking  sector. The  information on  banking
competition  policy  and  foreign ownership was  obtained  from  the  financial  services
commitments28  contained in the GATS and adapted from Mattoo (1998). These can be
interpreted  as  capturing  the  policy  stance  on  Mode  3  (commercial  presence,  or
establishment trade in financial services).
In order to  capture the policy stance on cross border trade  (mode 1 according to  the
GATS) in financial services, we thought it appropriate to include informnation  on current
and  capital account restrictions. Indeed, unrestricted flows on the current and capital
account  are necessary for cross-border trade in financial services.  For example, if  a
domestic company wants to borrow abroad and use the services of a foreign financial
services company, there must not be restrictions on foreign borrowing (capital account)
nor on payments for financial services rendered by the foreign company (current account).
To capture the ease of such cross-border trade, we used an index constructed by Dailami
(2000) using information from the I.M.F's  Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements
and  Exchange  Restrictions.  It  is  a  composite  index  based  on  a  coding  of  rules,
regulations,  and  administrative procedures  affecting capital  flows for  a  total  of  27
individual transactions in the current and capital account of the balance of payments for
each  country 29. Higher values of  Dailami's  index are indicative of greater  financial
openness  of  cross-border trade. As  evident  from  Dailami's  index, the  broadly open
countries  (in  terms of  having fewer  restrictions  on the  current  and  capital  account
transactions) are ones for which the Dailami index has a value of 1.6 or more,  and the
closed ones have a value below the 1.6 cut off.  Hence we implicity defined openness to
cross-border trade according to whether a  country's  rating on the Dailami index was
greater or less than 1.6.
In  interpreting a  country's  GATS financial services commitments relating to  market
structure,  an  entry of  "unbound"  or  "discretionary licensing" was  deemed to  be  an
"uncompetitive" market, whereas an entry of "none" was taken to imply the existence of a
competitive environment.  We created the financial services index using a lexicographic
method giving priority to market structure followed by openness to FDI and then by ease
of cross-border trade (see table below).
28  Since not all countries have made GATS commitments in financial services, we are automatically
restricted to the countries that did by the mid 1990s. For the telecom sector, the information from the
ITU spanned a much larger number of countries.
29  For more information, see Dailami (2000).
26Table 2
RANK  MARKET  FOREIGN EQUITY  CAPITAL CONTROLS
STRUCTURE  PERMITTED  (DAILAMI) INDEX
8  Competitive  > 50%  >  1.6
7  Competitive  > 50%  <1.6
6  Competitive  <50%  >1.6
5  Competitive  < 50%  < 1.6
4  Not Competitive  < 50%  > 1.6
3  Not Competitive  < 50%  < 1.6
2  Not competitive  <50%  >  1.6
1  Not competitive  < 50%  < 1.6
Hence, a higher score on our  index denotes greater openness to trade in financial services
than does a lower score. For a complete description on how countries ranked in terms of
financial sector openness, refer to Annex 3.
27Annex 3. Liberalization Indices by Country
COUNTRY  (FIN. LIB.  FIN. LIB. INDEX  COUNTRY NAME  (TELECOM LIB.
NAME  INDEX)  (ADJUSTED)  _  INDEX)
Angola  I  I  Algeria
Brazil  1  5  Benin  I
Gambia, The  I  I  Burkina Faso  I
Pakistan  1  3  Cameroon  1
Benin  I  I  Gabon  I
Sri Lanka  I  I  Gambia, The
Thailand  1  5  Kenya  I
Indonesia  2  7  Liberia  I
Colombia  3  7  Mali
Gabon  3  3  Niger  I
Tunisia  3  3  Sierra Leone  I
Dominican Rep.  3  7  Swaziland  I
Hungary  3  3  Zimbabwe  I
United Arab  3  3  Turkey  1
Emirates  l
Ecuador  3  7  Togo
Honduras  3  7  Tunisia  I
Nicaragua  4  8  Iran, Islamic Rep.
Peru  4  4  Syrian Arab Republic  1
Philippines  4  5  Cyprus  I
Mauritius  8  8  Myanrar  1
Uruguay  4  4  Angola  2
Venezuela  4  4  Nigeria  2
India  5  5  Papua New Guinea  2
Malaysia  5  5  Ethiopia  2.5
Morocco  5  5  Morocco  2.5
Bahrain  6  6  Costa Rica  2.5
Chile  5  7  Bangladesh  2.67
Korea  5  5  Cape Verde  3
Mexico  6  6  Central African  4
Republic
Malawi  7  7  Chad  4
Nigeria  7  7  Congo, Rep.  4
Senegal  7  7  Guinea-Bissau  4
Zimbabwe  7  7  Lesotho  4
Argentina  8  8  Malawi  4
Australia  8  8  Jamaica  4
Austri  8  8  Trinidad and Tobago  4
Belgium  8  8  Uruguay  4
Bolivia  8  8  Thailand  4
28COUNTRY  (FIN. LIB.  FIN. LIB. INDEX  COUNTRY NAME  (TELECOM LIB.
NAME  INDEX)  (ADJUSTED)  INDEX)
Canada  8  8  Yemen, Rep.  4
Costa Rica  7  7  China  4.33
Ghana  7  7  South Africa  5
Kenya  7  Ecuador
Malta  7  7  Nepal  5
Mozambique  7  7  Pakistan
Cyprus  8  8  Botswana  5
Demnark  8  8  Burundi  5
Egypt  8  8  Egypt, Arab Rep.  5
El Salvador  8  8  Guinea  5
Finland  8  8  Cote d'Ivoire  5
France  8  8  Mauritius  5
Germany  8  8  Mozambique  5
Greece  8  8  Uganda  5
Guyana  8  8  Zambia  5
Hong Kong,  8  8  Haiti  5
China  _
Iceland  8  8  Nicaragua  5
Ireland  8  8  Panama  5
Israel  8  8  Argentina  5
Italy  8  8  Bolivia  5
Jamaica  8  8  Brazil  5
Lesotho  8  8  Guyana  5
Luxembourg  8  8  Paraguay  5
Netherlands  8  8  Singapore  5
New Zealand  8  8  Greece  5
Norway  8  8  Hungary  5
Panama  8  8  Iceland  5
Poland  8  8  Ireland  5
Portugal  8  8  Malta  5
South Africa  8  8  Portugal  5
Singapore  8  8  Israel  5.33
Spain  8  8  Guatemala  5.33
Sweden  8  8  Poland  5 33
Switzerland  8  8  Venezuela  6 33
Turkey  8  8  India  6.33
United Kingdom  8  8  Indonesia  6.67
United States  8  8  Luxembourg  7
29Netherlands  7
_  =  ~~~~~~~~Honduras  7.67
_0  0  ~~~~~~~Perum  7.67 
=  _  ~~~~~~Sri  Lanka  7 67
29COUNTRY NAME  (TELECOM  LIB.  INDEX)
l________________  _________________  C  hile  8
l  ______________  Japan  8
l_______________  ________________  Korea, Rep.  8





Dominican Republic  9
El Salvador  9
Mexico  9
United States  9
Colombia  9














United Kingdom  9
Australia  9
30Annex 4: Regression results
Table 3 (Telecom and financial services indices individually)
Dependent variable: Growth of per-capita GNP (1990-'99)
Independent variables  Only
Whole sample  developing
countries
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4  -
Natural log of initial GNP  -.018***  -.023***  -.019***  -.032***
(1990)  (-2.96)  (-3.65)  (-2.93)  (-3.00
Primary education enrollment  .039*  .031  .019  .058
(1990)  (1.71)  (1.38)  (.78)  (1.53)
Lag of investment to GDP  .172***  .195***  .219***  .220***
ratio (1980-'89 average)  (4.50)  (3.98)  (3.86)  (2.86)
Government consumption to  -.193***  -.157***  -.159***
GDP ratio  (1990- '99 average)  (-3.20)  (-2.98)  (-2.77)
Average annual inflation rate  -.0004  -.001  -.001
(1990-'99)  (-.33)  (-.86)  (-.71)  -
Dummy variable  for tropical  -.025***  -.028***  -.026***  -.034***
countries  (-4.29)  (4.43)  (-3.80  (-3.30
Dummy for Sub-Saharan  -.012  -.007  -.022
Africa  (-1.40)  (-.84)  (-1.39)
Dummy for Latin American  .009  .013*  .008
countries  (1.34)  1.82)  (1.00)
Quality of institutions  .0001  .002  .002  .004
(.07)  (.96)  (.75)  (1.09)
Dummy variable  for political  .001  .351
stability  (.14)  .002)
Telecom services trade  .0018**  .0015*  .0020**  .0032*
liberalization index  (2.10)  (1.71)  (2.12)  (1.96)
Financial services trade  .0024**  .0025**  .0031**  .0036*
liberalization inde-x  (2.23)  (2.30)  (2.62)  (1.89)
I.M.F  goods trade  -.003**  -.003***  -.003**
restrictiveness index  (-3.46)  (-3.26)  (-2.27)
Constant  .139***  .168***  .121***  .174***
_  (4.53)  (4.65)  (3.62)  (3.70
R-squared  .69  .73  .68  .65
Number of observations  60  59  59  37
Note:  *,  *  ***  indicate  statistical  significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  levels
respectively. The bracketed figures indicate t-statistics constructed with Huber-White
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors.
31Table 4 (Composite services liberalization index)
Dependent variable: Growth of per-capita GNP (1990-'99)
Independent variables  Only
Whole sample  developing
countries
(l)  (2)  (3)  4
Natural log of initial GNP  -.018***  -.023***  -.014**  -.017**
(1990)  (-3.04)  (-3.67)  (-2.33)  (-2.58)
Primary education enrollment  .039*  .031  .025  .023
(1990)  (1.73)  (1.40)  (1.02)  (.98)
Lag of investment to GDP  .174***  .205***  .182***  .230***
ratio (1980- '89 average)  (4.34)  (3.95)  (3.43)  (3.24)
Government consumption to  -.185***  -.148***  -.190***  -.248***
GDP ratio (1990- '99 average)  (-3.27)  (-2.90)  (-3.15)  (-3.85).
Average annual inflation rate  -.001  -.001  -.0002  -.0001
(1990-'99)  (-.48)  (-1.09)  (-.16)  (-.07
Dummy variable  for tropical  -.026***  -.029***  -.023***  -.030***
countries  (-4.43)  (-4.36)  -3.61)  (-4.20
Dummyfor  Sub-Saharan  -.009
Africa  (-1.04)
Dummy for Latin American  .010
countries  (1.40)
Quality of institutions  -.00002  .002  -.001  -.002
(-.02)  (.83)  (-.57)  (-.80)
Dummy variable  for political  .001  -.001  -.001
stability  (.16)  (-.19)  (-.15)
Composite services trade  -.0041***  -.0040**  -.0056***  -.0039**
liberalization  index  (-2.75)  (-2.53)  (-3.23)  (-2.07)
I.M.F goods trade  -.0034***  -.0032***  -.004***
restrictiveness index  (-3.54)  (-3.24)  (-2.86)
Constant  .181***  .204***  .158***  .195***
(4.93)  (4.93)  (3.76)  (4.32
R-squared  .68  .73  .64  .78
Number of observations  60  59  59  37
Note:  *,  **,  ***  indicate  statistical  significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  levels
respectively. The bracketed figures indicate t-statistics constructed with  Huber-White
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors.
32Table 5 (Financial services index adjusted for observed market structure and
foreign bank penetration)
Dependent variable: Growth of per-capita GNP (1990-'99)
Independent variables  Whole sample
(1)  (2)  (3)
Natural log of initial GNP  -.017***  -.018***  -.018***
(1990)  (-2.70)  (-2.75)  (-2.78)
Primary education enrollment  .035  .035  .037
(1990)  (1.49)  (1.43)  (1.57)
Lag of investment to GDP ratio  .174***  .179***  .175***
(1980-'89 average)  (4.21)  (4.21)  (4.18)
Government consumption to  -.176***  -.175***  -.169***
GDP ratio (1990- '99 average)  (-3.11)  (-3.07)  (-3.09)
Average annual inflation rat-e  -.001  -.001  -.001
(1990-'99)  (-.83)  (-.81)  (-.96)
Dummy variable for tropical  -.027***  -.027***  -.027***
countries  (-4.57)  (-4.62)  (-4.56)
Quality of institutions  -.00002  -.0002  -.0001
(-.015)  (-.019)  (-.11)
Dummy variable  for political  -.001
stability  (-.21)
Telecom services trade  .0015*  .0018**
liberalization index  (1.81)  (2.04)
Adjustedfinancial services trade  .0027**  .0026**
liberalization  index  (2.17)  f2.14)
Composite services trade  .004***
liberalization index (adjusted)  (2.72)
I.MF goods trade  -.003***  -.003  -.0035***
restrictiveness index  (-3.30)  (-3.31)  (-3.46)
Constant  .136***  .141***  .140***
(4.40)  (4.17)  (4.55)
R-squared  .68  .69  .68
Number of observations  60  59  60
Note:  *,  **,  ***  indicate  statistical  significance  at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  levels
respectively. The bracketed figures indicate t-statistics constructed with  Huber-White
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors.
33Table 6 (Individual dummies for full liberalization of telecom and financial services)
Dependent variable: Growth of per-capita GNP (1990-'99)
Independent variables  Whole sample  Only developing
countries
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Natural log of initial GNP (1990)  -.022***  -.026***  -.027***  -.027***
(-3.33)  (-4.00)  (-3.31)  (-3.22)
Primary education enrollment  .049**  .042**  .074**  .075**
(1990)  (2.25)  (2.05  (2.34)  (2.34)
Lag of investment to GDP ratio  .162***  .201***  .227***  .210***
(1980- '89  average)  (4.16)  (3.92)  (4.07)  (3.20)
Government consumption to GDP  -.221 *"*  *  -.183***
ratio (1990- '99 average)  (-3.90)  (-3.38)
Average annual inflation rate (1990-  -.001  -.001  -.003  -.003
'99)  (-.55)  (-1.24)  (-1.31)  (-1.29)
Dummy variable  for tropical  -.030*.**  -.033***  -.037***  -.036***
countries  (-4.34)  (-4.74)  (-4.20)  (-3.99)
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa  -.006
(-.60)
Dummy for Latin American  .011
countries  (1.53)
Quality of institutions  .0002  .002  .002  .002
(.13)  (.95)  (.61)  (.59)
Dummy variable  for political  -.004  -.001  -.006
stability  (-.67)  (-.09)  (-.74)
Dummy variable  for full  .013*  .010*  .019**  .019**
liberalization of telecoms  (1.87)  (1.84)  (2.10)  (2.14)
Dummy variable  forfull  .013***  .012**  .021**  .023**
liberalization offinancial services  (2.67)  (2.35)  (2.13)  (2.05)
I.MF.  goods trade restrictiveness  -.004***  -.004***  -.005***  -.005*'*"*
index  (-3.62)  (-3.28)  (-3.37)  (-3.40)
Constant  .196***  .206***  .167***  .174***
(4.69)  (4.75)  (3.37)  (3.26)
R-squared  .70  .73  .62  .63
Number of observations  59  59  37  37
Note:  *,  **,  ***  indicate  statistical  significance at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1% levels
respectively. The bracketed figures indicate t-statistics constructed with  Huber-White
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors.
34Table 7 (Dummy variable for full liberalization of telecom and financial services)
Dependent variable: Growth of per-capita GNP (1990-'99)
Independent variables  Whole sample  Only developing
countries
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Natural log of initial GNP (1990)  -.019***  -.024***  -.018**  -.022**
(-2.69)  (-3.49)  (-2.28)  (-2.49)
Primary education enrollment  .052**  .042*  .038  .035
(1990)  (2.10)  (1.92)  (1.53)  (1.44)
Lag of investment to GDP ratio  .166***  .205***  .227***  .306***
(1980-'89 average)  (3.75)  (3.36)  (3.00)  (3.11)
Government consumption to GDP  -.209***  -.165***  -.261***  -.235***
ratio (1990- '99 average)  (-3.46)  (-3.04)  (-3.92)  (-3.37)
Average annual inflation rate (1990-  -.001  -.002  -.0004  -.001
'99)  (.73)  (-1.56)  (-.33)  (-.87)
Dummy variable  for tropical  -.026***  -.030***  -.031***  -.037***
countries  (-4.04)  (-4.33)  (-3.93)  (-4.25)
Dummy for Sub-Saharan Africa  -.009  .005
(-1.05)  (.41)
Dummy  for Latin American  .012  .015
countries  (1.44)  (1.40)
Quality of institutions  -.0004  .002  -.002  -.001
(-.26)  (.84)  (-.80)  (.31
Dummy variable  for political  -.003  .001  -.003  .001
stability  (-.45)  (.08)  (-.39)  (.13)
Dummy variable  forfull  .015**  .015**  .025**  .028**
liberalization of both sectors  (2.18)  (2.21)  (2.14)  (2.64)
i.MF. goods trade restrictiveness  -.004***  -.004***  -.005*"*"*  -.004**
index  (-3.70)  (-3.32)  (-3.07) (-2.49)
Constant  .170***  .190***  .182***  .185***
_  (4.17)  (4.33)  (3.83)  (3.32)
R-squared  .67  .71  .76  .78
Number of observations  59  59  37  37
Note:  *,  **,  ***  indicate  statistical  significance at  the  10%,  5%,  and  1%  levels
respectively. The bracketed figures indicate t-statistics constructed with Huber-White
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors.
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